Political Exclusion, Lost Autonomy, and Escalating Conflict over Self-Determination by Germann, Micha & Sambanis, Nicholas
        
Citation for published version:
Germann, M & Sambanis, N 2020, 'Political Exclusion, Lost Autonomy, and Escalating Conflict over Self-
Determination', International Organization.
Publication date:
2020
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Link to publication
FORTHCOMING: This article has been published in International Organization [http://doi.org/XXX]. This version
is free to view and download for private research and study only. Not for re-distribution, re-sale or use in
derivative works. © copyright holder.
University of Bath
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 05. Jun. 2020
Political Exclusion, Lost Autonomy, and Escalating
Conflict over Self-Determination
Forthcoming in International Organization
Micha Germann∗ Nicholas Sambanis†
April 2, 2020
Abstract
Most civil wars are preceded by nonviolent forms of conflict. While it is often
assumed that violent and nonviolent conflicts are qualitatively different and have
different causes, that assumption is rarely tested empirically. This paper uses a
two-step approach to explore whether political exclusion and lost autonomy—two
common causes of civil war according to extant literature—are associated with
the emergence of nonviolent separatist claims, with the escalation of nonviolent
separatist claims to war, or both. Our analysis suggests that different types of
grievances matter more at different stages of conflict escalation. We find that po-
litical exclusion is a significant correlate of the escalation of nonviolent claims for
self-determination to violence, while its association with the emergence of nonvi-
olent separatist claims is weaker. By contrast, lost autonomy is correlated with
both the emergence of nonviolent separatist claims and (if autonomy revocations
are recent) their escalation to violence. We argue that these results are consistent
with both grievance- and opportunity-based theories of conflict.
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1 Introduction
The conventional approach to the quantitative study of civil war is to compare observa-
tions of civil war onset to a heterogeneous control group that combines cases of actual
peace with cases of nonviolent conflict of varying type and intensity. This approach has
identified some robust correlates of civil war, but it has ignored the question of conflict
escalation. Civil wars almost always grow from nonviolent claims expressed intra- or
extra-institutionally (Cunningham et al. 2017), so to understand civil war we must really
understand why nonviolent conflicts escalate. A key insight from the literature on con-
tentious politics is that we cannot simply assume that violent and nonviolent conflict have
different causes (McAdam, Tarrow & Tilly 2001). To effectively test civil war theories,
we need to study the process of conflict escalation from nonviolent claims to violence.
We address this gap in the literature by analyzing the role of ethnic grievance factors in
the process of conflict escalation. Recent studies have established that grievances increase
the risk of ethnic war (Cederman, Wimmer & Min 2010, Wimmer, Cederman & Min
2009). However, these studies cannot tell us whether grievances have this effect because
they trigger the emergence of nonviolent claims, or because they affect the likelihood
that such claims, once formed, will turn violent. We are aware of only two studies that
explicitly consider the effects of ethnic grievances on conflict escalation and they point
to mutually contradictory conclusions (Bartusevicius & Gleditsch 2019, Lindemann &
Wimmer 2018). Thus, the exact role of grievances in conflict processes remains an open
question.
We focus our analysis on conflicts over self-determination. Self-determination (or sep-
aratist) conflicts revolve around disagreements over ethnic self-rule. While fundamentally
domestic in nature, separatist conflicts can have important consequences for the inter-
national system. Separatist claims led to the formation of more than twenty new states
since the end of the Cold War, as well as several de facto states and officially sanctioned
autonomy regimes. Separatism can sow the seeds for major inter-state disputes, as it has
in Sudan, Kashmir, and eastern Ukraine, and it accounts for more than a third of all
civil wars fought since 1945. However, according to a novel data source that we describe
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in more detail below, 90% of all separatist movements emerged as nonviolent—and two
thirds of all separatist movements never turned to violence. This paper explores whether
ethnic grievances are associated with the emergence of nonviolent claims for greater au-
tonomy or statehood and with the escalation of those claims to violence.
Previous literature has analyzed the effect of ethnic grievances on both separatist and
center-seeking wars. An advantage of our narrower focus is that we can theorize the
role of grievances among a set of cases with greater causal homogeneity and, therefore,
with greater specificity. We focus on two sources of grievances that are widely seen as
pertinent in the context of separatism: the exclusion of ethnic groups from state power
and losses of territorial autonomy, which can arise due to both domestic reasons (e.g., state
consolidation or assimilation) and international dynamics (e.g., annexation, conquest, or
border changes). Combining insights from different theoretical traditions, we argue that
while exclusion and lost autonomy may fuel both the emergence of nonviolent separatist
claims and their escalation to violence, they are not equally relevant at each stage of
conflict escalation in part because they create different incentives for mobilization and
opportunities for redress.
In keeping with a processual conception of conflict, our empirical analysis involves
two steps. In the first, we estimate the association between grievances (exclusion and
lost autonomy) and the onset of nonviolent separatist claims, broadly defined to include
both extra-institutional protest and institutional mobilization. In the second step, we
establish the association of the same two grievance factors with escalation to separatist
civil war conditional on a prior nonviolent separatist claim. Our analysis combines re-
cently introduced, group-level data on violent and nonviolent claims for self-determination
(Sambanis, Germann & Scha¨del 2018) with data on political exclusion (Wimmer, Ceder-
man & Min 2009, Vogt et al. 2015) and new data on recent and historical autonomy loss
for more than 750 ethnic groups around the world.
We find empirical support for our argument that not all types of ethnic grievance
are equally relevant at different stages of separatist conflict escalation. According to
our results, autonomy loss has a strong and highly robust association with the emer-
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gence of nonviolent separatist claims while exclusion does not. We suggest that this
could be because exclusion is more likely to motivate efforts to re-gain inclusion in the
central government rather than mobilization for territorial autonomy or secession. How-
ever, exclusion from the central government is robustly associated with the escalation of
nonviolent separatist claims to violence. We argue that this is in part because lack of
government representation reduces the effectiveness of pursuing separatist claims nonvi-
olently. Finally, our results suggest an association between autonomy loss and violent
escalation; however, that applies only to recent autonomy revocations and not to histor-
ical cases of autonomy loss. A possible reason is that distant memories from the past do
not inspire the same degree of resentment.
These new results contradict claims by opportunity theorists who see no significant
role for grievances in the escalation of nonviolent claims to violence. However, they
also suggest that sharp distinctions between opportunity and grievance factors may be
misguided since exclusion could be related to the escalation of nonviolent separatist claims
via both affective mechanisms highlighting the role of state illegitimacy and unfairness and
by shaping the opportunity structure. This points to the intertwined logics of grievances
and opportunities, which are complementary, rather than competing explanations for
conflict.
2 Related Literature and Approach
2.1 The Classic Debate
Classic studies by Gurr (1970), Horowitz (1985), and others see grievances as a direct
cause of both nonviolent contention and rebellion. However, that view has been ques-
tioned by the opportunity school, which argues that while grievances may be necessary
for the formation of nonviolent claims and social movements, they are too ubiquitous to
explain why some dissident groups resort to violence and others do not. For Tilly (1978)
and other opportunity theorists, it is not grievances that are the key to understanding
why nonviolent conflicts escalate, but the political opportunity structure—constraints
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and costs to violent mobilization. These arguments are echoed in political economy ap-
proaches, such as Fearon & Laitin (2003) and Collier & Hoeffler (2004).
Recent studies have challenged the primacy of opportunity over grievances as an
explanation of rebellion. Using new data coded at the ethnic group level, Wimmer,
Cederman, and Min show that political exclusion, defined as the lack of representation of
ethnic groups in a state’s governing coalition, is strongly correlated with ethnic war onset
(Wimmer, Cederman & Min 2009, Cederman, Wimmer & Min 2010). Other studies using
group-level data suggest that losses of territorial autonomy (Cederman et al. 2015, Saxton
& Benson 2006) or wealth differences between ethnic groups (Cederman, Gleditsch &
Buhaug 2013) are associated with ethnic civil war.
While these studies changed the debate on the role of grievances in civil war, a limita-
tion is that they do not account for prior nonviolent mobilization. They cannot, therefore,
establish whether grievances are directly related to civil war onset or indirectly, through
their effect on nonviolent mobilization. A series of recent studies have linked politi-
cal exclusion, lost autonomy, and other grievance factors with the emergence of extra-
institutional protest campaigns (e.g. Chenoweth & Ulfelder 2017, Cunningham 2013b) and
the occurrence of self-determination claims (Siroky & Cuffe 2015, Sorens 2012). Over-
all, it remains unclear whether grievances affect only the emergence of nonviolent claims
(as opportunity theory predicts) or both the emergence of nonviolent claims and their
escalation to violence (as grievance theory predicts).
2.2 Approach and Antecedents
To improve our understanding of the role of grievances in civil war processes, we need to
shift to a more processual understanding of intra-state conflict. We do so by using a two-
step approach that first considers the role of ethnic grievance factors in the emergence of
nonviolent separatist claims and, in a second step, their role in the escalation of nonviolent
claims to separatist war. This approach allows us to explore the role of ethnic grievances
at different stages in the process of conflict escalation.
Our focus on escalation has antecedents in a small number of quantitative studies
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(e.g. Cunningham 2013a). Directly relevant is a recent article by Lindemann & Wimmer
(2018), which investigates the conditions under which 58 ethnic groups with high propen-
sities for rebellion resort to arms. Their findings suggest that both grievances (resulting
from indiscriminate state violence) and opportunities (in the form of refuge areas) matter
for conflict escalation. Our study complements the findings of Lindemann & Wimmer in
two main ways. First, we consider the association between violent outbreaks and non-
violent forms of indiscriminate repression, specifically revocations of autonomy and lack
of representation at the center. Second, we use a two-step approach that allows us to
explicitly distinguish the effects of grievances on nonviolent claims and their escalation
in the same framework.
Two-step models similar to ours are common in the literature on inter-state war,
but we are aware of only two prior studies employing this approach in the literature on
civil war (Bartusevicius & Gleditsch 2019, Cunningham et al. 2017). The most directly
relevant study is by Bartusevicius & Gleditsch, who also use a two-step approach to
investigate the role of ethnic exclusion and discrimination in intra-state conflict. Their
findings suggest that ethnic exclusion/discrimination is positively related to the emer-
gence of “incompatibilities” between the state and domestic challengers, but not with
the escalation of incompatibilities to violence, thus adding to skepticism regarding the
role of grievances in violent rebellion. But while we agree with Bartusevicius & Gleditsch
about the value of two-step approaches, we believe that their study design suffers from
limitations that make us question their findings.
First, Bartusevicius & Gleditsch simultaneously analyze both ethnic and non-ethnic
conflicts; and they conduct all analysis at the country level. However, there is no reason
to expect that ethnic grievances should be related to non-ethnic conflict escalation; and
aggregating all group-level data to the country level implies that the effects of group-
specific grievances cannot be adequately captured. Group-level data, as we use below, is
more appropriate to study group-specific escalation.
Second, Bartusevicius & Gleditsch argue that civil wars are only likely to emerge
from extra-institutional nonviolent mobilization, such as demonstrations, strikes, or civil
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disobedience. They suggest that as a result, institutional nonviolent mobilization can be
disregarded in the study of conflict escalation. We disagree with this view. While most
civil wars have roots in some kind of nonviolent conflict, the build-up to civil wars does
not necessarily progress linearly from institutional to extra-institutional contention to
war (McAdam, Tarrow & Tilly 2001). There can be direct transitions from institutional
contention to war, such as when militant and extremist groups capture party politics
(Mansfield & Snyder 2005). According to a recent data collection, only 26% of sepa-
ratist violence onsets were preceded by one or more out of five common forms of extra-
institutional mobilization in the previous year (40% when considering the three years
preceding violence onsets) (Cunningham, Dahl & Fruge´ 2017). While a narrow focus on
extra-institutional contention may be consistent with recent studies of nonviolent strate-
gies of resistance (e.g. Chenoweth & Ulfelder 2017, Cunningham, Dahl & Fruge´ 2017), it
is not necessarily the right approach when it comes to the study of conflict escalation as
it results in omitting the nonviolent formative stages of some civil wars. Therefore, in
our analysis we choose to rely on a broader definition of nonviolent conflict that includes
any kind of organized nonviolent claim-making, including institutional forms.
Finally, Bartusevicius & Gleditsch draw their data on extra-institutional protest from
the CONIAS dataset (Schwank et al. 2013). This compounds the problems we described
above because CONIAS covers protests only if they cross an (ambiguously defined) inten-
sity threshold. In particular, CONIAS includes protests only if they are rejected by the
state as “unacceptable”, which makes it even more likely that the nonviolent formative
stages of civil wars are missing. Two thirds of the conflicts included in CONIAS are
violent from the start (Bartusevicius & Gleditsch 2019, p. 230) despite clear evidence
of prior nonviolent mobilization in many cases (see section 1 in the online appendix for
details). Furthermore, by dropping “acceptable” forms of protest, CONIAS selects out
protest campaigns that are unlikely to turn violent—especially in democracies, where
demonstrations and strikes are widely accepted means of claim-making—and this can
lead to bias. To avoid these problems, we rely on an alternative source of data on non-
violent separatist claims with improved coverage of the nonviolent formative stages of
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separatist wars.
3 Theory
In this section, we develop a refined theory of the role of exclusion and lost autonomy in
separatist conflict processes. Consistent with grievance theory, we expect that exclusion
and lost autonomy matter at both conflict stages; however, we argue that exclusion has
a weaker relation with the emergence of nonviolent separatism as it generates different
mobilization incentives and opportunities for redress. Moreover, we suggest that affective
mechanisms are not the only possible link between grievances and violent escalation.
3.1 Exclusion, Lost Autonomy, and Nonviolent Claims for Self-
Determination
Existing theories point to two different mechanisms linking exclusion and lost autonomy
to the emergence of nonviolent separatist claims. First, they can both lead to a collective
interest in increasing ethnic self-determination. In the case of exclusion, this is because
exclusion violates a core principle of political legitimacy in the modern era—rule by
co-ethnics—and because it can generate economic inequality and material deprivation
(Cederman, Wimmer & Min 2010). Lost autonomy, in turn, can stoke resentment about
the group’s diminished social status and incentivize efforts to restore the group’s former
power (Hechter 2000).
Second, ethnic grievances generated by exclusion or lost autonomy can alleviate col-
lective action problems (Cederman, Gleditsch & Buhaug 2013). Both exclusion and lost
autonomy can be perceived as a form of nonviolent, indiscriminate repression targeting
an ethnic group. The indiscriminate nature of such repression should increase ethnic
solidarity (Gurr 2000) and, by triggering emotions such as fear and resentment, increase
the willingness to resist (Nugent 2019, Young 2019).
These mechanisms can provide ethnic groups with a motive and increase their ability
to pursue nonviolent separatist claims. However, we argue that autonomy loss should
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have a stronger association with nonviolent separatist claims than exclusion. This is
because aggrieved groups do not only face a choice between no action or mobilizing for
territorial self-determination. Ethnic groups can also mobilize for inclusion at the center;
and as representation at the center is likely to reduce political and economic dominance
by ‘ethnic others’, mobilizing for inclusion can be an equally if not more attractive goal for
excluded groups. By contrast, regaining territorial self-rule clearly constitutes the most
direct form of redress for groups who have lost territorial autonomy. Therefore, we expect
that autonomy losses are primary motives in the nonviolent pursuit of self-determination,
whereas exclusion will have a weaker association.
H1: Both exclusion and lost autonomy are associated with a higher risk of nonviolent
separatist claim onset, but the association between exclusion and nonviolent separatist
claim onset is weaker.
So far we have taken a static view of grievances, but timing is likely to matter.
Grievance theory suggests that, the more recent are grievances due to state policy,
the more intensely felt is the frustration and motivation for collective action (Snow
et al. 1998). In particular, recent retractions of autonomy are more likely to generate
resentment about unfair treatment by the state and push groups to “reverse the reversal”
(Cederman et al. 2015, Petersen 2002). Recent autonomy retractions should therefore be
especially likely to increase the onset of nonviolent separatist claims.
However, analogously to our previous argument, this does not necessarily extend to
recent loss of representation at the center. In fact, recent exclusion could plausibly have
no effect at all. Compared to groups that have always been excluded, groups that until
recently have formed part of a state’s governing coalition are likely to have a relatively high
degree of attachment to the state or nation. While recent exclusion is likely to motivate
collective action, such action is likely to be directed at regaining representation at the
center. We therefore expect that recent exclusion has either a weak or no association
with the onset of nonviolent separatist claims.
H2: Recent autonomy loss is associated with a higher risk of nonviolent separatist
claim onset, whereas recent exclusion has a weak or no association.
9
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3433666
3.2 Escalation to Violence
Given social norms against the use of violence and considering the high costs of violent
conflict, groups seeking self-determination are likely to make nonviolent claims initially.
However, as Gurr (1970) and other grievance theorists have long maintained, grievances
can increase the risk that nonviolent claims escalate to violence. In part, that is because
perceptions of unfair treatment by the state increase the plausibility, justifiability, and
diffusion of the idea that the state needs to be violently “smashed” and reorganized
(Goodwin 1997, Wood 2003). Moreover, perceptions of unfair treatment increase the
willingness of group members to participate in risky actions and rebellion (Petersen 2002).
In contrast to our argument about the emergence of nonviolent claims, we expect both
exclusion and lost autonomy to have strong effects on escalation to separatist violence.
The fact that groups have articulated an interest in greater self-rule and have begun to
mobilize means that they can overcome some problems to collective action; and affective
mechanisms triggered by either exclusion or autonomy loss should make it more likely that
nonviolent claims escalate to violence. However, affective mechanisms are not the only
possible link with violent escalation. We argue that exclusion may also be connected
to violent escalation as it limits the opportunity to pursue claims nonviolently. The
tactical choices of dissident groups are at least in part based on rational cost-benefit
evaluations (e.g. Tilly 1978). Therefore, factors such as state capacity that are commonly
associated with opportunity models should shape the decision to escalate (Fearon &
Laitin 2003). But so should exclusion, which reduces access to institutional channels
for claim-making and thereby the effectiveness of nonviolent strategies. More generally,
persistent grievances, including those due to autonomy losses, demonstrate to nonviolent
movements the futility of nonviolent tactics.
The bargaining model of war provides further support for the idea that both exclusion
and autonomy revocations make it more likely that nonviolent separatist claims escalate
to war. The bargaining model highlights the role of information asymmetries and commit-
ment problems that impede the peaceful resolution of conflicts (Fearon 1995). Exclusion
or revocations of autonomy serve as reminders that the state cannot be trusted to up-
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hold a settlement, thereby magnifying the commitment problems from the perspective of
groups challenging the state (Sambanis & Zinn 2004, Siroky & Cuffe 2015). Grievances
due to long-standing exclusion or autonomy loss could also increase perceptions of issue
indivisibility. Highly aggrieved groups are more likely to make maximalist claims, such
as claims for outright secession (Regan & Norton 2005)—and territory is much harder to
divide than sovereignty (Goddard 2006).
H3: Both exclusion and lost autonomy are associated with increased risk that nonvi-
olent separatist claims escalate to violence.
The preceding discussion suggests that the risk of conflict escalation is highest if
grievances are recently imposed. Recent status downgrades—such as losing representation
at the center or losing autonomy—are especially likely to stoke ethnic violence due to
resentment and desire for revenge. At the same time, commitment problems are magnified
if the state has recently moved to curtail a group’s rights. Moreover, since an active
separatist claim signals a diminished attachment to the state/nation, a recent loss of
power at the center will further diminish national identification and fuel the risk of violent
escalation.
H4: Both recent exclusion and recent autonomy loss are associated with increased risk
that nonviolent separatist claims escalate to violence.
4 Data
4.1 Self-Determination Claims
We use data from the recently introduced self-determination movements (SDM) dataset
(Sambanis, Germann & Scha¨del 2018), which codes all SDMs from 1945 to 2012. SDMs
are defined as movements constituted by one or more organizations that are connected to
an ethnic group making claims for territorially-defined self-rule. SDM includes a broad
range of claims ranging from limited internal autonomy demands (e.g. Mayas in Mexico)
to demands for national independence (e.g. Scots in the UK) or merger with another
state (e.g. Serbs in Bosnia). There must be evidence of organized political mobilization
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for a movement to be included in SDM. Mobilization may be violent or nonviolent, extra-
institutional, or part of conventional politics. SDM codes an end to a movement if a
group ceases to make public claims or the group secedes.
For each year of activity SDM codes whether there was violent separatist conflict
over self-rule, defined as lethal conflict with casualties on both sides. Both major wars
and low-intensity wars are included. SDM draws its data on separatist war from several
sources, including the UCDP dataset (Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg &
Strand 2002), Doyle & Sambanis (2006), and Minorities at Risk (MAR) (Gurr 2000).
The left panel of Figure 1 gives annual counts of the number of violent and nonviolent
SDMs.
SDM significantly improves coverage of separatist claims relative to previously avail-
able sources, especially when it comes to nonviolent claims and the nonviolent formative
stages of separatist wars.1 Overall, SDM identifies 464 self-determination movements in
120 countries2—or around three times as many separatist conflicts as CONIAS or the
well-known dataset by Cunningham (2014) during similar time frames. Two thirds of the
separatist conflicts in SDM never became violent and only 10% of the separatist conflicts
were violent in their first year. By comparison, half of the separatist conflicts identified
by Cunningham became violent and a quarter were violent from the start. In the CO-
NIAS dataset, 80% of the separatist conflicts were violent and almost half were violent in
their first year (suggesting that CONIAS used violence outbreaks as an indication that
protests were “unacceptable” to the government, per our earlier discussion).
4.2 EPR
We merge the SDM data on separatist claims with group-level data on exclusion from
the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset (Wimmer, Cederman & Min 2009), version
2014 (Vogt et al. 2015). EPR is less likely than MAR to over-represent groups that
are discriminated against by the state and merging with EPR allows us to engage with
previous studies on political exclusion. However, it is important to note that our reliance
1See section 2 in the online appendix for an extended discussion.
2The supplementary materials include coding notes for all 464 cases.
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Figure 1: Annual frequencies of violent and nonviolent self-determination claims
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on EPR also has costs since by anchoring our study on EPR we lose many of the groups
in SDM. In particular, EPR only includes groups defined over race, language, or religion.
Similarly to MAR and other extant sources of data on separatism, the SDM dataset in
addition considers regionally-defined groups (e.g. the Lombards in Italy). Given EPR’s
narrower definition of ethnicity, these cannot be included here. EPR also does not code
groups in overseas territories and provides no data for 1945. Overall, we are able to match
289 of the 464 SDMs to EPR groups, or 62%.3 The SDMs that can be linked to EPR
are somewhat more likely to have engaged in separatist violence, but a majority (55%)
never used violence, and in only 22 cases were self-rule claims violent from the start. The
right panel in Figure 1 gives annual breakdowns of the number of violent and nonviolent
SDMs in EPR.
4.3 Dependent Variables
We analyze two binary dependent variables. The first captures the onset of a nonviolent
claim for self-determination, coded 1 in the first year an organization made a separatist
claim on behalf of an ethnic group and 0 otherwise while dropping the 22 cases of SDMs
3See section 3 of the online appendix for more details.
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that start violent. All group-year observations with an ongoing separatist claim after the
first year are dropped. Overall, there are 192 nonviolent separatist claim onsets in our
data. A total of 13 groups have two onsets due to discontinuous separatist activity. No
group has more than two.
The second dependent variable captures conflict escalation, coded 1 if we observe a
transition from a nonviolent separatist claim to separatist violence and 0 otherwise. All
observations without a prior nonviolent separatist claim are dropped, including the 22
cases of SDMs that start violent, as are observations with ongoing armed conflict. We
code 159 cases of conflict escalation; 77 are ‘first-time’ escalations, while the other 82
represent cases of conflict recurrence in the same state-group dyad.
4.4 Main Explanatory Variables
Our main explanatory variables are political exclusion and lost autonomy. We use data on
exclusion from the EPR dataset, which measures exclusion as a binary variable indicating
whether a group has (0) or does not have (1) representation in the national executive at
the beginning of a calendar year.4
We provide new data on autonomy loss. Many previous studies have drawn data on
lost autonomy from MAR (e.g. Siroky & Cuffe 2015), but MAR covers only a fraction of
the groups in EPR (250 out of EPR’s 800 groups). We revised and expanded the MAR
data on lost autonomy to include all EPR groups in our analysis. Similarly to MAR,
lost autonomy is coded equal to 1 under three scenaria: if a group used to control an
independent state that was annexed, invaded, or no longer exists for any other reason
(e.g., the Estonians in the former Soviet Union); if a change of borders leads to groups
being stranded outside of their home state (e.g., Russians in Ukraine after 1991); and if a
group had, but lost, significant internal autonomy within a larger state (e.g., the Kosovar
Albanians in Serbia after 1989). For all three scenaria we code autonomy loss since the
year 1800. We drew on a broad array of sources for the coding of lost autonomy, including
several encyclopedias focused on ethnic and separatist groups, Encyclopedia Britannica,
4We revised EPR’s coding of political exclusion in selected cases (see the online appendix).
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the country studies series of the Library of Congress, EPRs regional autonomy indicator,
MAR, and various case-specific sources.5
As it captures more than 200 years of ethnic group histories, this measure of autonomy
loss is fairly static. To test our hypotheses about the short-term implications of losses of
autonomy and losing representation, we code two additional binary variables measuring,
respectively, whether groups lost representation at the center or autonomy during the
previous two years.
4.5 Controls
We control for a large number of variables that have been associated with separatist war
in previous studies. Group-level controls include regional concentration; relative group
size; cross-border separatist kin groups; regional autonomy; presence of oil/natural gas
resources; mountainous terrain; and non-contiguity to the main body of the country. The
latter three are specific to ethnic settlement areas and therefore available only for region-
ally concentrated groups. Country-level controls include constant GDP per capita (in
logs); total population size (in logs); democracy score; federal institutions; and the total
number of politically relevant ethnic groups. Systemic conditions that might influence
separatism are captured by a binary indicator for the Cold War. The online appendix
provides information on data sources and summary statistics.
5 Results
5.1 Nonviolent Separatist Claim Onset
We start by analyzing the effects of exclusion and lost autonomy on the onset of nonviolent
separatist claims, 1946–2012. Table 1 reports descriptive statistics and Table 2 a series of
regression models. We drop all groups that dominate the executive branch of government
without sharing power with any other groups (e.g. Turks in Turkey) because these groups
almost by definition make no separatist claims against the state that they control. To
5See section 4 of the online appendix for additional details.
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Table 1: Nonviolent separatist claim onset propensity by exclusion and lost autonomy
Obs. # of claim onsets
Exclusion:
No 8527 35 0.41%
Yes 15160 157 1.04%
Lost autonomy (since 1800):
No 12541 55 0.44%
Yes 11146 137 1.23%
Recent exclusion (2 years):
No 23460 189 0.81%
Yes 227 3 1.32%
Recent autonomy loss (2 years):
No 23516 179 0.76%
Yes 171 13 7.60%
Total 23687 192 0.81%
account for time dependence, all regression models include cubic polynomials counting
the number of years since the beginning of the sampling period or since the last time
a group made a claim (Carter & Signorino 2010). We estimate both logit regressions
with region fixed effects (odd model numbers) and ordinary least square regressions with
country fixed effects (even model numbers). Standard errors are clustered by country.
The unit of analysis is the country-group-year.
Consistent with H1, we find a positive, statistically significant, and robust association
between lost autonomy and the onset of nonviolent separatist claims.6 According to
model 1 in Table 2, groups that have experienced a loss of autonomy since 1800 are 0.9
percentage points more likely (0.4% vs 1.3%) to start making a nonviolent separatist claim
(p < 0.01).7 For comparison, regional concentration, which many consider a necessary
condition for separatism, increases the probability of a nonviolent separatist claim onset
in the same model by 0.8 percentage points (from 0.2% to 1%). Cross-border separatist
kin—another frequently cited factor conducive to separatism—leads to an increase of 0.5
percentage points (from 0.8% to 1.3%).
Model 1 also suggests a positive correlation between exclusion and the onset of non-
6All regressions control for a group’s level of autonomy, which allows us to estimate the effect of
autonomy loss at different levels of observed autonomy.
7All predicted probabilities are based on the observed values approach.
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Table 2: Regression models explaining the onset of nonviolent separatist claims
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Logit OLS Logit OLS Logit OLS Logit OLS
Ethnic grievances:
Exclusion 0.987∗∗ 0.004+ 0.718∗ 0.004
(0.314) (0.002) (0.324) (0.003)
Lost autonomy (since 1800) 1.098∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.871∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗
(0.354) (0.003) (0.295) (0.004)
Recent exclusion (2 years) 0.516 0.006 0.617 0.007
(0.508) (0.007) (0.497) (0.009)
Recent autonomy loss (2 years) 2.363∗∗∗ 0.069∗ 2.113∗∗∗ 0.077∗
(0.434) (0.027) (0.457) (0.032)
Group-level controls:
Regional concentration 1.562∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗ 1.860∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗
(0.372) (0.003) (0.376) (0.003)
Relative group size 0.536 -0.006 -0.272 -0.009 -1.274+ -0.015∗∗ -1.798∗ -0.021∗∗
(0.668) (0.005) (0.786) (0.008) (0.656) (0.005) (0.822) (0.008)
Separatist kint-1 0.555
∗∗ 0.008∗∗ 0.611∗∗ 0.008∗ 0.630∗∗ 0.009∗∗ 0.694∗∗ 0.008∗
(0.202) (0.003) (0.235) (0.004) (0.208) (0.003) (0.251) (0.004)
Regional autonomy 0.210 0.002 0.036 0.003 -0.144 -0.000 -0.220 0.000
(0.298) (0.005) (0.371) (0.006) (0.342) (0.005) (0.391) (0.006)
Hydrocarbon reservest-1 0.679
∗ 0.005 0.652∗ 0.002
(0.268) (0.003) (0.304) (0.003)
Mountainous terrain 0.203 -0.002 0.193 -0.001
(0.356) (0.004) (0.329) (0.004)
Noncontiguity 2.112∗∗ 0.023 2.200∗∗ 0.021
(0.737) (0.022) (0.695) (0.022)
Country-level controls:
ln(GDP per capitat-1 ) 0.454
∗ 0.006 0.380 0.009+ 0.414+ 0.007 0.342 0.009+
(0.215) (0.004) (0.241) (0.005) (0.224) (0.004) (0.251) (0.005)
ln(country populationt-1 ) 0.339
∗∗ -0.005 0.306∗∗ -0.010 0.340∗∗ -0.005 0.297∗∗ -0.008
(0.108) (0.007) (0.110) (0.009) (0.113) (0.007) (0.115) (0.010)
Democracyt-1 -1.068 -0.021
∗ -1.848∗ -0.018 -1.521∗ -0.022∗ -2.120∗∗ -0.021
(0.749) (0.010) (0.802) (0.013) (0.683) (0.010) (0.743) (0.013)
Federal statet-1 0.526 0.002 0.620
+ -0.000 0.395 0.003 0.585+ 0.002
(0.371) (0.012) (0.333) (0.015) (0.392) (0.011) (0.344) (0.014)
Number of relevant groups -0.034∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.034∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.030∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.031∗∗∗ 0.000
(0.007) (0.001) (0.008) (0.001) (0.007) (0.001) (0.007) (0.001)
Systemic conditions:
Cold War -0.037 0.001 -0.295 -0.001 -0.152 -0.000 -0.372 -0.002
(0.326) (0.004) (0.358) (0.005) (0.323) (0.004) (0.355) (0.005)
Time controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FEs Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Country FEs No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Only concentrated groups No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Groups 686 686 528 528 686 686 528 528
Countries 140 140 121 121 140 140 121 121
Observations 23612 23612 18169 18169 23612 23612 18169 18169
Note: All models include a constant (not shown). Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
violent separatist claims. However, this correlation is both smaller8 and less robust. As
model 2 shows, the association of exclusion with nonviolent separatist claim onset misses
conventional levels of statistical significance when country fixed effects are included (p =
0.09). By contrast, the effect of autonomy loss since 1800 increases in both size (+1.3 per-
8Model 1 implies that exclusion increases the probability of a nonviolent claim onset by 0.7 percentage
points, from 0.4% to 1.1%.
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centage points) and statistical significance (p < 0.001) when accounting for unobserved
country-level heterogeneity. Similar conclusions are reached when we restrict the sample
to regionally concentrated groups (see models 3 and 4). Regional concentration comes
close to a necessary condition for separatism9 and restricting the sample to concentrated
groups allows us to include three additional controls that are specific to ethnic settlement
areas: the presence of hydrocarbon reserves, non-contiguity, and mountainous terrain.10
Models 5 to 8 in Table 2 re-estimate the same suit of models while replacing the static
versions of exclusion and lost autonomy with our variables measuring recent exclusion and
recent autonomy loss within the previous two years. In line with H2, model 5 suggests
that a recent autonomy revocation is associated with a 6 percentage point increase in
the probability of a nonviolent separatist claim onset in model 5 (from 0.8% to 7%,
p < 0.001). This suggests that ethnic groups that have recently experienced a loss of
autonomy are almost 800% more likely to make nonviolent claims for self rule. This
result is robust to the inclusion of country fixed effects (model 6) and to the addition
of numerous controls (models 7 and 8). Meanwhile, we find no evidence to suggest that
recent loss of representation would affect the probability of nonviolent separatist claim
onset; a conclusion already suggested by a simple χ2-test (p = 0.39).11
We report additional robustness checks in section 8 of the online appendix, including
models with only region or country fixed effects and no other controls, models with a large
battery of additional controls, a formal sensitivity analysis to assess sensitivity to hidden
bias, changing the threshold used to code historical losses of autonomy from 1800 to
1900; and using different temporal cut-offs for the recent exclusion and recent autonomy
loss variables. Overall, these additional checks suggest that both historical and recent
autonomy loss have a highly robust, positive association with nonviolent separatist claim
9Only 5% of the nonviolent separatist claim onsets in our data involve groups that lack regional
concentration as coded in EPR.
10In section 10 of the online appendix, we investigate whether the association of exclusion with nonvi-
olent nonviolent separatist claim onset is conditional on groups having lost autonomy; and, conversely, if
the association of lost autonomy with nonviolent nonviolent separatist claim onset is stronger or weaker
for excluded groups. Although it is plausible that group resentment is maximized when both forms of
repression are present, we see no clear evidence for interactive effects in the data. Due to the low number
of cases, we cannot explore interactions involving recent exclusion and/or recent autonomy loss.
11There are only 3 instances of nonviolent separatist claim onset after a recent loss of representation.
The overlap is therefore too limited for formal hypothesis testing in regression models.
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onset whereas political exclusion at the center does not. The formal sensitivity analysis
provides additional evidence that the effect of exclusion is sensitive to violations of the
exogeneity assumption. Moreover, we find that the effect of exclusion (but not autonomy
losses) is sensitive to dropping influential countries with large numbers of nonviolent
separatist claim onsets, such as Russia and the former Soviet Union. Across a large
number of specification and measurement choices, recent loss of representation almost
never has a statistically significant effect.
Summing up the results thus far, we find strong evidence that autonomy loss and
especially recent autonomy revocations are correlated with the onset of nonviolent sepa-
ratist claims. Meanwhile, exclusion has a weaker association with nonviolent separatist
claim onset that is not robust, whereas recent exclusion is clearly uncorrelated. These
results could suggest that exclusion (especially if recent) is more likely to lead to mobi-
lization aimed at reinstating the group’s representation at the center rather than a push
for self-determination. We posit this as a hypothesis in need of further testing, since a
direct test would require the collection of new group-level data on nonviolent claims for
more inclusion in central government. We cannot, therefore, rule out that exclusion is
simply a weaker type of grievance around which to mobilize nonviolently.
5.2 Conflict Escalation
Most SDMs in our data remain nonviolent; and those that do escalate are, on average,
preceded by 9 years of nonviolent claim-making before the first outbreak of violence.
We now explore whether exclusion and lost autonomy are associated with the violent
escalation of SDMs, 1946–2012. The unit of analysis remains the country-group-year, but
all analyses are now conditional on prior nonviolent separatist claims. The dependent
variable is conflict escalation, defined as a transition from nonviolent separatist claims to
separatist war. Table 3 shows descriptive statistics for each type of grievance.
Table 4 reports the regression results. We show separate models for first-time escala-
tions (dropping all observations after the first incidence of violence) and all escalations
(including cases of war recurrence). All regressions include controls for time dependence
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Table 3: Escalation propensity by exclusion and lost autonomy
First-time escalation All escalations
Obs. # of escalations Obs. # of escalations
Exclusion:
No 1088 11 1.01% 1485 27 1.82%
Yes 3683 66 1.79% 5200 132 2.54%
Lost autonomy (since 1800):
No 1299 11 0.85% 1795 24 1.34%
Yes 3472 66 1.90% 4890 135 2.76%
Recent exclusion (2 years):
No 4739 74 1.56% 6638 155 2.34%
Yes 32 3 9.38% 47 4 8.51%
Recent autonomy loss (2 years):
No 4728 71 1.50% 6616 145 2.19%
Yes 43 6 13.95% 69 14 20.29%
Total 4771 77 1.61% 6685 159 2.38%
(cubic polynomials of the number of years since the group first made a nonviolent sep-
aratist claim or, where applicable, since the last spell of separatist war). As before, we
estimate both logit models with region fixed effects (odd model numbers) and ordinary
least squares regressions with country fixed effects (even model numbers). As the groups
that make separatist claims are almost all regionally concentrated and this allows us
to include the full set of controls, all regression models restrict the sample to concen-
trated groups (results are similar when all groups are included; see the online appendix).
Standard errors are clustered at the country level.
In line with H3, we find evidence that nonviolent claims are more likely to escalate
to separatist war if groups are excluded from power. According to model 1, exclusion
increases the risk of first-time escalation by 1.5 percentage points (from 0.7% to 2.2%,
p < 0.01). If we include cases of war recurrence in the analysis (see model 5), exclu-
sion increases escalation risk by 1.2 percentage points (from 1.6% to 2.8%, p < 0.05).
The magnitude of these changes is similar to the association of per capita GDP with
escalation12; GDP per capita is generally considered the strongest predictor of civil war
12According to models 1 and 5, respectively, moving GDP per capita from the 25th to the 75th percentile
decreases the risk of first-time escalation by 1.3 percentage points and the risk of all escalations by 1.2
percentage points.
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Table 4: Regression models explaining the escalation of nonviolent separatist claims to
separatist war
First-time escalation All escalations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Logit OLS Logit OLS Logit OLS Logit OLS
Ethnic grievances:
Exclusion 1.135∗∗ 0.024∗ 0.607∗ 0.021+
(0.386) (0.012) (0.267) (0.011)
Lost autonomy (since 1800) 0.353 0.004 0.299 0.008
(0.371) (0.005) (0.263) (0.007)
Recent exclusion (2 years) 1.190∗ 0.068 0.589 0.044
(0.573) (0.044) (0.488) (0.040)
Recent autonomy loss (2 years) 1.086∗ 0.067 1.877∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗
(0.512) (0.044) (0.360) (0.051)
Group-level controls:
Relative group size 1.188 0.029+ -0.509 0.002 -0.056 0.028 -0.952 -0.001
(1.029) (0.017) (1.195) (0.019) (0.875) (0.019) (1.067) (0.020)
Separatist kint-1 0.318 -0.002 0.644
+ 0.004 0.356+ 0.003 0.538∗∗ 0.008
(0.378) (0.009) (0.368) (0.008) (0.198) (0.007) (0.198) (0.006)
Regional autonomy 0.556 0.013 0.471 0.010 0.347 0.014 0.319 0.012
(0.504) (0.013) (0.475) (0.012) (0.301) (0.011) (0.275) (0.010)
Hydrocarbon reservest-1 0.142 0.009 0.247 0.010 0.216 0.021
+ 0.188 0.021+
(0.367) (0.009) (0.333) (0.010) (0.286) (0.011) (0.241) (0.011)
Mountainous terrain 0.217 0.003 0.354 0.005 0.506 0.013 0.502 0.016+
(0.588) (0.013) (0.612) (0.012) (0.353) (0.009) (0.372) (0.009)
Noncontiguity -0.885 0.020 -0.420 0.029 -0.710 0.016 -0.635 0.026∗
(0.651) (0.014) (0.605) (0.018) (0.475) (0.011) (0.485) (0.013)
Country-level controls:
ln(GDP per capitat-1 ) -0.615
∗ -0.012 -0.563∗ -0.013 -0.323+ -0.006 -0.272 -0.007
(0.243) (0.009) (0.223) (0.009) (0.169) (0.007) (0.168) (0.008)
ln(country populationt-1 ) -0.060 -0.019 -0.038 -0.015 -0.005 -0.018 0.003 -0.015
(0.153) (0.022) (0.151) (0.022) (0.103) (0.014) (0.101) (0.014)
Democracyt-1 -0.288 0.015 -0.762 0.010 -0.417 -0.012 -0.554 -0.014
(0.987) (0.016) (0.862) (0.014) (0.624) (0.018) (0.643) (0.018)
Federal statet-1 0.153 0.004 -0.065 -0.001 0.259 0.013 0.185 0.008
(0.416) (0.031) (0.343) (0.028) (0.302) (0.025) (0.284) (0.023)
Number of relevant groups -0.010 0.000 -0.005 0.000 -0.015 -0.001 -0.012 -0.000
(0.017) (0.002) (0.016) (0.002) (0.012) (0.001) (0.012) (0.001)
Systemic conditions:
Cold War 0.472 0.015∗ 0.547+ 0.014+ 0.086 0.010 0.154 0.009
(0.346) (0.008) (0.309) (0.008) (0.190) (0.006) (0.189) (0.007)
Time controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FEs Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Country FEs No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Only concentrated groups Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of groups 221 221 221 221 260 260 260 260
No. of countries 86 86 86 86 89 89 89 89
Observations 4452 4452 4452 4452 6351 6351 6351 6351
Note: All models include a constant (not shown). Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
onset. Models 2 and 6 suggest that exclusion remains positively associated with both
first-time escalation (p < 0.05) and all escalations (p = 0.06) when country fixed effects
are included.
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Table 3 shows that escalations are around twice as likely among groups that have
lost autonomy; however this correlation misses conventional levels of statistical signifi-
cance after regression adjustment (see Table 4). A possible reason is that this variable
captures historical losses of autonomy going back decades or longer. Resentment and
other effects of autonomy loss may dissipate over time. In line with H4, we find much
larger and statistically significant associations when looking at more recent autonomy
losses. This applies especially when we include repeated escalations. According to model
7, a recent autonomy revocation increases the risk of violent escalation by a massive 10
percentage points (from 2% to 12%, p < 0.001). If we drop cases of war recurrence, the
association with escalation is smaller (+3 percentage points according to model 3, p <
0.05) and misses conventional levels of statistical significance when country fixed effects
are included (model 4). Although we cannot make any causal claims with this analysis,
these patterns could suggest that the logic of conflict escalation is different in conflicts
that have already turned violent; and that revocations of autonomy are then especially
damaging. The violence and protests in the aftermath of the recent scrapping of Kash-
mir’s special autonomy arrangement offer a case in point. However, the small number of
cases constitute a significant limitation and we point out that the unadjusted escalation
risk after a recent autonomy downgrade is not too different in the first-time escalation
sample (see Table 3).
Finally, Table 3 also points to a possible relation between recent exclusion and conflict
escalation. However, there are only 32 instances of groups losing representation at the
center during an active nonviolent separatist claim and in only 3 cases do we see a violent
escalation. In regression models, we generally find no statistically significant association;
but in light of the small number of cases, we cannot fully explore the connection between
recent exclusion and escalation.
Additional results reported in section 9 of the online appendix suggest that the effects
of recent autonomy loss (when including cases of war recurrence) and exclusion survive
a large number of robustness checks, model specification changes to add/drop controls,
models using different temporal cut-offs to code recent autonomy loss, and models drop-
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ping influential countries with multiple instances of conflict escalation.13 We get similar
results when using data on separatist armed conflict from a different source (UCDP)
and, according to a formal sensitivity analysis, the effects of these variables are rela-
tively robust to unobserved confounders.14 We also find evidence that exclusion has a
pronounced effect on conflict escalation if groups are not only powerless, but actively dis-
criminated against by the state. This is consistent with our theoretical framework, given
that discrimination is likely to increase resentments against the state and commitment
problems.15
5.3 Beyond Exclusion and Lost Autonomy
The regression models reported above control for many common predictors of separatist
war onset. Therefore, our results also allow us to shed light on the ability of variables
other than exclusion and lost autonomy to account for the escalation of nonviolent sep-
aratist claims. First, though, it is worth noting that several of our controls have more
or less robust associations with the emergence of nonviolent separatist claims—this is
true notably for regional concentration, territorial non-contiguity, country-level popula-
tion size, and GDP per capita. However, we find that many of the variables that are
purported to measure “opportunity” for insurgency (e.g. non-contiguity, mountainous
terrain, and country population) (Fearon & Laitin 2003) have no robust association with
the escalation of nonviolent separatist claims to violence. Similarly, resource wealth (hy-
drocarbon reserves) in the territory occupied by separatist groups, relative group size, as
well as (see Tables S11 and S15 in the online appendix) regional concentration, the size
of a government’s military, and occurrences of civil war in neighboring countries have no
13We find no evidence for a meaningful interaction between exclusion and lost autonomy (see section
10 of the online appendix).
14Unobserved factors correlated with selection into the nonviolent conflict stage and with violent
escalation could bias estimates. Sample selection models constitute a standard econometric response,
but these require a valid instrument. As we explain in section 5 of the online appendix, we do not believe
that a valid instrument for nonviolent separatist conflict can be found. While this limits our ability to
make causal claims, the formal sensitivity analysis helps improve our confidence in the correlations we
have presented and establishes their robustness to hidden sources of bias.
15Further evidence for a connection between exclusion and violent separatist claims emerges as all but
one of the 22 separatist claims that started out as violent involve excluded groups (see section 11 in the
online appendix).
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robust association with the escalation of nonviolent separatist claims.
An important conclusion that emerges from our analysis is that many of the variables
that have been thought to explain the outbreak of separatist war are in fact capturing
conditions that are conducive to the emergence of nonviolent separatist claims and cannot
explain why nonviolent separatist claims escalate to violence. An exception is country-
level GDP per capita, which has a positive and significant association with the onset
of nonviolent separatist claims and a negative and significant correlation with violent
escalation. Income is therefore one of the few covariates that increase the specificity
of models of separatist war beyond exclusion and recent autonomy loss. Additional
results reported in the online appendix suggest that the proximity of an ethnic group to
international land borders can also increase the risk of escalation. This is consistent with
arguments about the difficulty of state-building in peripheral areas and with previous
results on the destabilizing effect of cross-border groups and cross-border sanctuaries
(Salehyan 2007).
6 Conclusion
Patterns of conflict escalation have been under-explored in the literature on civil war. We
made use of novel data and a two-step approach to explore the role of ethnic grievances in
separatist conflict processes. While our analysis cannot identify causal effects of exclusion
or lost autonomy, the two-step approach improves over the conventional way of modeling
civil war onset and produces valuable new insights.
One new insight is that ethnic grievances matter for both the onset of nonviolent
separatist claims and the escalation of such claims to violence; however, different types of
grievances matter more at different stages of the escalation process. On the one hand, we
find that while political exclusion is robustly associated with the escalation of separatist
conflicts to violence, exclusion has no robust association with the emergence of nonviolent
separatist claims. A possible explanation that could be usefully explored further using
qualitative methods is that excluded groups often choose to mobilize for representation
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at the center rather than pursue territorial self-determination; and that this might reflect
a higher attachment to the nation for groups that have had some prior experience of
inclusion. On the other hand, our results suggest that whereas both recent and more
historic autonomy losses increase the probability that groups start to make nonviolent
separatist claims, only recent autonomy revocations affect the escalation risk.
Taken as a whole, our analysis contradicts claims by opportunity theorists that
grievances are too ubiquitous to explain why conflicts escalate from nonviolent claims
to violence while lending support to grievance theory as articulated previously by Gurr,
Horowitz, Cederman, and Wimmer. However, this paper adds a more nuanced per-
spective to this literature that puts grievances front and center while also support-
ing opportunity-cost theories of mobilization and rebellion. Political exclusion is not
simply a measure of grievance; reduced access to the state implies diminished oppor-
tunities to address grievances nonviolently and, in turn, limited opportunities for the
nonviolent adjudication of disputes increase the risk of war. More generally, consis-
tent with recent studies that merge grievance- and process-based theories (Lindemann
& Wimmer 2018, Shadmehr 2014) we find that factors associated with both grievance
and opportunity models (especially country wealth and proximity of ethnic groups to
borders) are associated with the escalation of separatist conflicts from nonviolent claims
to violence.
That said, we also found that many other variables that are thought to be “determi-
nants” of civil war cannot in fact distinguish between violent and nonviolent separatist
claims. While models of civil and separatist war tout their specificity and predictive
accuracy, many of their key explanatory variables seem to explain separatist claims gen-
erally, rather than separatist war per se. Our results suggest that the extant literature
on civil war may be overly confident about its ability to identify the causes of war onset,
which could explain the predictive failures that have been identified by scholars in the
forecasting literature (Ward, Greenhill & Bakke 2010).
Our analysis points to several avenues for future research. First, future research could
extend our focus on separatist conflict processes and collect analogous data on ethnic
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claims for representation at the center. That would allow similar two-step tests of the
role of ethnic grievances and other factors in ethnic conflicts related to control over the
center, including a direct test of one of our key predictions—that exclusion has a weaker
association with the emergence of nonviolent separatist claims as many excluded groups
instead mobilize for inclusion.
Second, we employed a broad understanding of nonviolent separatist claims that in-
cludes both institutional and extra-institutional mobilization. While this allowed us to
more reliably cover the nonviolent formative stages of separatist war, it could also be
instructive for future research to disentangle escalation patterns following different forms
of nonviolent claim-making. Of interest would be to explore nonviolent escalation from
conventional claim-making to extra-institutional protest.
Finally, even though the number of cases we had to work with was small, our finding
that recent autonomy revocations make escalation to separatist war more likely suggests
that a cognitive shift away from structural indicators to more fine-grained data and
dynamic models could prove the key to increasing the specificity of civil war models and
improving out-of-sample predictions. A promising avenue for further research would be
to collect detailed event data on both violent and nonviolent government responses to
groups making claims for self-determination.
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